





Incoherence is usually regarded as a bad thing. Incoherence suggests irrationality, confusion, 
paradox. Incoherentism disagrees: incoherence is not always a bad thing, sometimes we 
ought to be incoherent. If correct, Incoherentism has important and controversial 
implications. It implies that rationality does not always require coherence. 
The aim of this paper is threefold. First, I motivate the idea that we should embrace the 
possibility of rational incoherence in epistemology. I argue that sometimes incoherence is 
rationally permissible, and a particular kind of incoherence - level-incoherence – is sometimes 
rationally required. Level-incoherence occurs between beliefs about what we ought to 
believe, and the rest of our beliefs. The view that it is sometimes required by rationality not 
only enables us to solve a puzzle arising from rational mistakes about what rationality 
requires2, but it allows our normative beliefs to have more-or-less the same epistemology as 
the rest of our beliefs.  
Second, I point out how incoherence more generally has various underappreciated epistemic 
benefits. In some cases it can help progress inquiry, enable us to have true beliefs, and allow 
us to deliberate about what we ought to believe in a way that is minimally disruptive to the 
rest of our beliefs. With this in mind, we should not be particularly worried by the idea that 
sometimes rationality requires level-incoherence.  
Third, I argue that Incoherentism is importantly different from an alternative view with which 
it agrees on some points – Dilemmism (Alexander, 2013; Hughes, 2019). Both views deny that 
what we are required to do, epistemically, is always coherent. However, they do so in 
different ways, with different motivations, and with different theoretical backgrounds. 
Dilemmism says that the requirements of epistemology sometimes generate dilemmas – 
situations in which the agent is subject to two incompatible requirements. In such situations, 
 
1 Thanks are due in particular to Giada Fratantonio, Nick Hughes, and Stefano Lo Re for extremely helpful 
comments on earlier drafts. I also thank the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AH/T002638/1 “Varieties of 
Risk”), for their support.  
2 I argued for this elsewhere, so the argument for this here will be minimal (Field, forthcoming, 2020). 
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the agent ought to comply with each of the requirements, but cannot because they are 
incompatible. Dilemmists are pessimistic about the possibility of resolving these dilemmas.  
Incoherentism is more optimistic. Incoherentists say that there is a way to resolve these 
conflicts of requirements – it is to acknowledge that epistemic rationality sometimes 
generates a univocal requirement to be incoherent.  
After identifying some important differences between these two ways of embracing conflict, 
I offer some reasons to prefer Incoherentism over Dilemmism. Namely, that Incoherentism 
allows us to deliberate about what we ought to believe using ordinary epistemology, and it 
does a better job of accommodating the positive features of incoherence.  
The following section outlines one way that requirements of rationality appear to conflict. 
Most solutions to this conflict have assumed that rationality requires coherence. Section 1 
outlines the conflict. In Section 2 I argue that widespread emphasis on coherence in rationality 
is misguided, and in Section 3 I bolster this by offering some reasons to think that incoherence 
sometimes has independent epistemic benefits. In Section 4 I distinguish some different ways 
of embracing incoherence in epistemology, focussing on some underappreciated differences 
between Incoherentism and Dilemmism. In Section 5 I give some reasons to prefer 
Incoherentism to Dilemmism.   
1. The Conflicting Demands of Rationality 
Sometimes, the demands of rationality appear to conflict. A good example of this is situations 
in which your evidence about what is rationally required is misleading.  
Suppose that according to the true requirements of rationality, you are required to ɸ - to 
believe P, perhaps3. However, suppose you also have very good evidence that, in fact, you are 
required to not ɸ. What now? Should you ɸ or not? On the one hand, the true requirements 
of rationality seem to require that you ɸ. On the other hand, your evidence (which you have 
no reason to dismiss) indicates you are required not to ɸ. So, it appears you are subject to 
conflicting requirements of rationality. You appear to be required to both ɸ and not ɸ.  
 
3 This could be any requirement of rationality you like. For example, perhaps you are required to not believe 
contradictions, but then you take a logic course from a dialetheist and acquire evidence that, sometimes, 
believing contradictions is required. Or, perhaps you read this paper and are convinced that Incoherentism is 
true. In fact, it’s not but you now have evidence that sometimes you ought to be incoherent. I have discussed 
such cases in more detail elsewhere (Field, forthcoming, 2019, 2020). 
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This kind of situation can arise in any context in which we deliberate about the epistemic 
status of our beliefs: ordinary first order deliberation about what the evidence supports, 
philosophical deliberation about which epistemic theory is correct, or deliberation by a jury 
about what their evidence supports. 
Here is the Incoherentist view: you should both believe what your evidence supports, and you 
should comply with the true requirements of rationality. So, in the example above, you should 
believe “I ought not ɸ”, because this is what your evidence supports, but you should also 
comply with the true requirements of rationality. So, you should also ɸ. 
It is worth saying something about what I mean by the ‘true requirements’ here. Obviously, 
there is something platitudinous about saying that ‘according to the true requirements, you 
ought to ɸ’. That is precisely what is at issue – what the true requirements are, in this case. 
However, it is important that the puzzle is stated in this way. The conflict arises only on the 
assumption that there is some fact of the matter about what the true requirements of 
rationality are, and it is possible to be mistaken about what they are. Incoherentism says that 
being mistaken, even rationally, about what the true requirements are does not change the 
facts about what they are. 
Incoherentism recommends this because it endorses two key assumptions about rationality: 
that it requires that you believe what is supported by your epistemic situation, and there is at 
least one further requirement of rationality applicable to all agents, in all situations. When 
we combine these two assumptions with the more controversial claim that rationality does 
not always require coherence, we get the result that Incoherentism permits rational belief 
combinations that involve both beliefs of the form I ought to ɸ, and not-ɸ. This is unusual in 
epistemology: most views have assumed that rationality requires coherence. The following 
section examines this idea that rationality requires coherence and argues that it is misguided.  
2. Coherence is overrated 
It is widely thought that evaluations of rationality involve, either entirely or in part, an 
evaluation of whether an agent is coherent. In evaluating whether an agent is coherent, we 
might ask whether their attitudes are consistent, whether their credences are probabilistically 
coherent, whether their reasoning obeys rules of closure, or whether their first order 
attitudes cohere with their higher order attitudes. It is this final sense of coherence that 
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Incoherentism sometimes requires4. If rationality were primarily about coherence, then this 
narrows down the possible answers to the problem of conflicting requirements: you should 
either do what you believe you are required to do (and violate the requirements of 
rationality), or you should do what you are required to do and also believe that this is what 
you are required to do. In other words, you should comply with the following wide-scope 
principle: 
Enkratic Principle: O (BOΦ → Φ) 
Reading O as “rationally required”, and Φ as representing an epistemic attitude, the Enkratic 
Principle says that rationality requires either having the attitudes you believe you ought to 
have, or giving up the belief that you ought to have those attitudes. It prohibits combinations 
of attitudes that include the belief that believing P is required, but not the belief P. 
Incoherentism denies that the Enkratic Principle is a requirement of rationality. This is 
because it thinks that there are some situations in which the rational thing to do is to believe 
that you ought to have some epistemic attitude, but not actually have that attitude.  This is a 
violation of the Enkratic Principle. As Incoherentists see it, we are sometimes required to 
violate the Enkratic Principle because rationality requires that you believe what is supported 
by your epistemic situation, and it also requires that you obey the true requirements of 
rationality, whatever they are.  In absence of independent reasons to comply with the 
Enkratic Principle5, if S is in a situation that supports false belief about what is rationally 
required, Incoherentism will say that she is required to violate the Enkratic Principle.  
I am not the first to wonder if coherence might be overrated as a rational ideal. There are 
many other examples of scepticism about the value of coherence. For example, Broome and 
Kolodny begun a distinct debate asking whether there might sometimes be good reasons to 
be incoherent6. Others have questioned whether the demands of logical consistency are 
 
4 While I am not entirely convinced of the value of the other kinds of coherence, the focus here is on level-
coherence. Incoherentism says that level-incoherence is sometimes required. Later in this section, I argue that 
some first order incoherent beliefs are permissible – when one’s (incomplete, or flawed) evidence supports them 
(as in FORUMS, p.6). However, I do not think that these beliefs are required.  
5 I argue that there is no such independent reason elsewhere (Field (forthcoming, ms)).  
6 See (Broome, 1999, 2007, 2013; Kolodny, 2005, 2008; Raz, 2005). This debate is distinct from the one I am 
engaged with here. This other debate has usually identified ‘rationality’ with ‘coherence’ and characterised the 
guiding question as ‘could there be a reason to be irrational?’. Here, I am not assuming that rationality requires 
coherence, so a better way to characterise this debate is as asking whether there could be reasons (particularly, 
reasons of the ‘right kind’ – that is, epistemic reasons) to be incoherent.   
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normative for belief7. Dialetheist logicians have thought that logic is normative, but that 
semantic paradoxes such as the Liar mean that the correct logic permits rational 
incoherence8. And, some evidentialists have thought that the possibility of misleading higher 
order evidence means that sometimes our evidence supports incoherent combinations, such 
as both “P” and “my evidence does not support P”9.    
However, those who have argued against coherence requirements of rationality have, for the 
most part, done so negatively. They have offered reasons to be incoherent that outweigh the 
value of being coherent – semantic paradoxes, eccentric billionaires willing to pay you to be 
incoherent, or evidential support. These debates tend not to disagree that coherence is, in 
general, rationally valuable. They just think it is not quite as good as other epistemic goods 
that might sometimes be on offer10. Incoherentism, in contrast, says that it is sometimes good 
to be incoherent. The key point is that Incoherentists think that incoherence can sometimes 
be a positive thing, from the point of view of rationality. 
One of the main reasons coherence has been thought rationally valuable is that rationality 
has been taken to be primarily concerned with having a perspective on the world that is 
internally consistent11. On this view, rationality is a property that supervenes entirely on an 
agent’s internal mental attitudes. Coherence is an essential property of rationality if in 
evaluating an agent we are considering only her mental attitudes and not how those attitudes 
match up with the facts. On this view, coherence is always rationally valuable12. Since the 
Enkratic Principle preserves a particular kind of coherence between attitudes, the Enkratic 
Principle is just a consequence of being committed to this internalist idea that epistemic 
rationality primarily concerns coherence. There is no getting around this.  
 
7 See in particular (Harman, 1986), as well as (Besson, 2012; Hjortland, 2017; Macfarlane, 2004). 
8 See (Priest, 1979, 1985, 2005, 2006). 
9 See (Lasonen-Aarnio, forthcoming, 2020, 2014; Weatherson, 2010, 2019). 
10 For example, Priest views consistency as one among many desirable qualities that a rationally acceptable 
theory should have, others being: 'simplicity, problem-solving ability, non-adhocness and fruitfulness’ (2004: 
32). 
11 This is not the only argument in favour of the Enkratic Principle, though as I argue elsewhere (Field 
(forthcomoing, ms)), it is difficult to find good independent reasons to like the Enkratic Principle, meaning that 
when it leads to problematic conflicts between requirements of rationality, there is little reason to cling to it.  
12 See (Gibbons, 2013; Kvanvig, 2014; Lord, 2018; Zimmerman, 2008). 
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Incoherentism does not think that coherence is an essential property of rationality, nor even 
particularly rationally valuable. Although, it often accompanies instances of doxastic 
rationality, it is not valuable in itself.  
There are various familiar reasons to worry about purely coherentist accounts of epistemic 
rationality. For example, if coherence were all that mattered, this would imply that any 
attitude at all could, in principle, be rational. This makes a mystery of the value of rationality13. 
Early objections to coherentism pointed out that entirely false belief sets can count as 
justified when all that is required for justification is coherence (see Sosa (1980: 19)). This 
possibility makes the value of rationality particularly mysterious for agents with many false 
beliefs. If attitudinal coherence were the only requirement of rationality, there would be no 
reason to expect that being rational would lead to valuable epistemic goods such as truth and 
knowledge. This would exasperate the epistemically negative consequences of false belief. 
Agents would be incentivized to adjust their belief sets to maintain coherence with a false 
belief, thus taking themselves ever further away from belief sets that accurately reflect the 
world14.  
Coherence certainly does not seem valuable when it appears in the absence of other 
epistemic goods. Consider the following example:  
FORUMS: Billy stays up all night reading nonsense on forums frequented by 
conspiracy theorists. He acquires a coherent web of beliefs that support 
various deranged conspiracy theories. The deeper he goes into the 
conspiracy theorists’ forums, the more coherent and false beliefs he adds 
to his web. In the morning, he wakes up and reads a report from the BBC 
that conflicts with his web of nonsense. Noticing the conflict, he dismisses 
the BBC report as misleading.   
Billy’s beliefs, after he dismisses the BBC report, are coherent. However, they are also false 
and completely detached from reality. In becoming coherent in the way that he does, Billy 
takes himself further away from truth and knowledge, and deeper into the clutches of falsity 
and conspiracy theory. In epistemically evaluating Billy, how should we count his beliefs’ 
 
13 A mystery that has gone unsolved for some time (see Broome (2013), Kolodny (2005), Raz (2005)). 
14 This is particularly worrying in light of the observation that those who believe conspiracy theories often have 
coherent belief sets (see Nguyen (2018a, 2018b)). 
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coherence? If coherence were rationally valuable in itself, we should approve of it – we should 
think that it is one good thing to say about Billy’s attitudes (albeit the only good thing). 
However, FORUMS also illustrates how coherence can be dangerous when in the wrong 
hands. In this case, coherence does not seem to be a particularly good thing – it leads Billy 
astray, reinforces his conspiracy theories, and causes him to end up believing more 
falsehoods. 
One way to explain what is going on here is that, usually, coherence goes together with other 
epistemically valuable things. For example, being coherent is often a way of believing true 
things, manifesting success-conducive dispositions15, responding correctly to our (possessed) 
reasons16, or respecting the evidence17. However, while this explains why we tend to associate 
coherence with rationality, it does not tell us that coherence is valuable in itself, because it 
does not show that coherence is also valuable when these other epistemic goods are absent. 
At best, this might give us an error theory that explains why we thought that coherence was 
required by rationality18. 
Coherence is most useful when we begin from beliefs that are true. Suppose I know P, and I 
know that I know P. Suppose that I am trying to decide whether to believe Q or not-Q, and I 
have no reason to think that either is more likely to be true than the other. If Q is inconsistent 
with P, then I can rule it out and infer not-Q, since this is the only remaining option. I have 
used coherence to increase my knowledge. However, this strategy is successful only when we 
begin from knowledge that we know we have. Unfortunately, ordinary non-ideal beings are 
often not in this situation. When we use this method beginning from unknown beliefs, we risk 
ending up with even more false beliefs. So, at least for fallible and non-ideal agents like us, 
coherence is of limited value for epistemic inquiry. Exactly the same applies to non-ideal 
inquiries about what we ought to believe. If S believes that she rationally ought to believe P, 
and this is true, then coming to believe P is an improvement. However, if this is false, and P is 
rationally prohibited, then it worsens her epistemic situation by causing her to believe 
something irrational.  
 
15 Lasonen-Aarnio (2020). 
16 Lord (2018). 
17 Feldman (2005), Worsnip (2018). 
18 This is something I argue for elsewhere, so I won’t dwell on it here (Field, forthcoming, ms).  
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One might be tempted to think that coherence requirements on rationality are justified not 
by the value of coherence, but rather the disvalue of incoherence. Classical logic prohibits 
contradictions in large part because of the trouble contradictions cause, and we might think 
that something similar applies to other kinds of incoherence. Not only are contradictions 
obviously false, but standard classical disjunction rules mean that anything follows from a 
contradiction. It cannot be rational to believe contradictions, because it cannot be rational to 
believe everything – this would make our beliefs trivial. Additionally, barring quantum 
strangeness, we know that logically inconsistent sets of propositions cannot be true. This 
means that someone who believes obviously inconsistent propositions can easily know that 
they have at least one false belief. This means that if they continue believing the inconsistent 
set, they would be knowingly believing at least one false thing, as well as something that they 
know they cannot know. This seems bad, and one good thing to say about coherence is that 
it protects the agent from this bad situation19. However, as the following section argues, it is 
not so clear that incoherence is always bad. 
3. Incoherence is Underrated  
Those who have argued against coherence requirements of rationality have usually done so 
in a negative way. They have offered reasons to be incoherent that outweigh the 
requirements of coherence, without saying that there is anything good about incoherence. In 
this section, I suggest that there are some positive things to be said in favour of incoherence, 
at least sometimes, for some non-ideal agents with incomplete information.   
3.1 Signals 
The first positive thing to say about incoherence is that it can serve as an indication of 
epistemic problems, signalling the need for correction or double-checking.  
For Socrates, alerting people to incoherence in their philosophical views was an essential 
teaching tool, and the resulting aporia an important step on the road to truth and knowledge. 
Proof by contradiction also makes use of incoherence as a way of furthering inquiry. A derived 
contradiction acts as a signpost that means 'stop, something has gone wrong!'. Incoherence 
is also useful in argumentative interactions – mutually acknowledged inconsistency can help 
 




interlocutors with disparate commitments to agree on when theories should be rejected. 
Whatever else has been called into dispute, rational interlocuters will typically agree that 
believing contradictions is unacceptable20. 
Incoherence can alert individuals to problems with their beliefs, prompting them to subject 
them to closer scrutiny, or seek out more evidence21. This is usually an epistemically better 
thing to do than merely reconcile the incoherence without undertaking further inquiry. For 
example, compare Billy to another frequenter of dodgy forums: 
FORUMS 2: Sanjay stays up all night reading nonsense on forums frequented 
by conspiracy theorists. He acquires a coherent web of beliefs that support 
various deranged conspiracy theories. In the morning, he wakes up and 
reads a report from the BBC that conflicts with his web of nonsense. He 
believes the report, notices the conflict, and is puzzled.  
Whereas Billy remedied his incoherence quickly, by immediately dismissing the evidence from 
the BBC report, Sanjay does not. This puts Sanjay in a better situation to Billy, because he has 
an epistemic tool that Billy lacks. His puzzlement is a signal – it gives him reason to scrutinise 
his beliefs further. Billy does not have this reason – from his perspective all is well, there is no 
incoherence, and so no reason to inquire further. Furthermore, retaining the inconsistent 
belief allows Sanjay to revisit the matter later. As he receives further information, he may 
even be able to dig himself out of his web of conspiracy theory. For example, if he reads more 
trustworthy sources that cohere with the BBC report and conflict with the conspiracy 
theories, the epistemic weight of the conspiracy theories will be gradually outweighed.  
In cases like this, incoherence is a healthy part of rational inquiry that has a non-ideal starting 
point. This would be difficult to capture if we thought that Sanjay was always rationally 
required to maintain a coherent perspective.  
Incoherentism has no trouble capturing this. It says that not all incoherence is irrational, 
indeed, sometimes agents should have incoherent beliefs. Incoherentism is thus able to 
 
20 Assuming that both parties accept classical inference rules, and therefore that anything follows from a 
contradiction, then both will agree that believing all statements would be irrational, so neither should believe a 
contradiction. If one party in the argument believes all statements, then they also believe the other party's 
theory, and so the argument breaks down. 
21 As Lasonen-Aarnio (2020) puts it, incoherence can be a striking and ‘conspicuous’ reason to revise our beliefs. 
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accommodate the rationality of Sanjay’s incoherent puzzlement. It is worth clarifying that 
Incoherentism does not say that Sanjay ought to remain incoherent. Ideally, this incoherence 
would be the beginning, not the end of inquiry. The point is that at the moment of 
puzzlement, before inquiry has continued, Sanjay is rational.  
Of course, we might wonder whether there is a way of capturing these benefits of incoherent 
puzzlement without endorsing the view that it is sometimes rational to have incoherent 
attitudes. For example, perhaps Sanjay should suspend on the conflicting BBC report, rather 
than believe it (Lord and Sylvan, forthcoming). As a first pass, the idea that Sanjay could 
choose to suspend judgment rather than believe suggests a degree of doxastic control that it 
is not clear we have. However, even if we did have such control, there are at least three 
further problems with this suggestion.  
First, it is not clear that suspension would be able to generate the same benefits as incoherent 
beliefs. Incoherent beliefs are useful because they are signals that prompt further inquiry. To 
be good signals, they need to be striking. Requiring the agent to adopt a weaken attitude 
would be detrimental to this purpose. If Sanjay suspends on the report, but continues to 
believe the conspiracy theories, then the conspiracy theory beliefs will occupy a stronger 
epistemic position in his epistemic perspective. He will have reasons to prioritise them over 
other conflicting information he might receive, and this will exasperate his problems22. 
Second, it is not clear that suspending will always be a rational response that will save us from 
incoherence. If I believe P, but merely suspend on not-P, this also exhibits incoherence – if I 
think that P is true, basic logic tells me that not-P must be false. So, it’s not clear that 
suspending would solve the problem. Third, if we think that there are positive epistemic 
duties to believe propositions that we have sufficient evidence for, then suspending on the 
BBC report may be a violation of those duties23. 
Both Billy and Sanjay immediately notice the incoherence between their conspiracy-theoretic 
beliefs and the BBC report. The difference between them is in how they respond to this 
 
22 Could he suspend on both the report and the conspiracy theories? This would put the beliefs on an equal 
footing, but it would be an impractical strategy over time. 
23 As Simion (forthcoming) argues.  Of course, that depends on whether we think that the BBC report constitutes 
‘sufficient evidence’ for these agents, which will depend on the stance we take on what evidence is. This is 




incoherence. Billy dismisses the report, embarking further into a dark web of conspiracy 
theory; Sanjay remains puzzled, and (we hope) uses this puzzlement to improve his beliefs. 
We might wonder how to evaluate unnoticed incoherence. Traditionally, philosophers have 
thought more positively about unnoticed incoherence than noticed incoherence. This makes 
sense if we precede from the assumption that incoherence is always irrational. If the agent 
has not noticed the incoherence, it is perhaps unreasonable to expect her to amend it, and 
unfair to blame her for the failure. If she has noticed it, but not amended it, then she is 
responsible for the irrationality. However, noticing the potential epistemic benefits of 
incoherence might push us to think differently. Billy and Sanjay are better off in virtue of 
having noticed their incoherence – noticing it allows them to do something about it. Although 
Billy precedes in the wrong way, noticing the incoherence at least gave him the opportunity 
to move towards the truth. Of course, if there were independent reason to think that 
coherence was epistemically good, this argument would be suspicious – one epistemic wrong 
does not make a right. However, if the most important reasons to like coherence are its 
connection to truth, and sometimes being incoherent can be a more positive influence on 
whether we believe the truth, then we should acknowledge that incoherence is sometimes a 
positive epistemic influence, and all the more positive when it is recognised by the agent.  
Of course, ideally we would not need incoherent beliefs to prompt us into managing our 
beliefs well. Ideally, we would always be in a position where we were able to find the error, 
work out what to do about it, and reach a conclusion that is both true and coherent. But, we 
are not ideal. In the absence of further information or immediate opportunities to investigate 
further, incoherence is often rationally valuable.  
3.2 Epistemic Goods 
Sometimes, adopting incoherent attitudes can be a way to get epistemic goods directly. Truth 
is the clearest example. Sometimes, incoherent states are true. While this is not the case for 
logical inconsistencies, level-incoherent combinations prohibited by the Enkratic Principle can 
be true. This is because matching first and higher order propositions do not entail each other. 
Suppose that you parked your bike in the shed last night, as usual, and you have no reason to 
suspect that it is anywhere else now. The following proposition is true: you ought to believe 
that your bike is in your shed. You ought to believe that your bike is in your shed because you 
remember putting it there, your memory is reliable, you live in a safe neighbourhood where 
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bike theft is rare, and so on. However, none of this entails the proposition your bike is in your 
shed – I might have stolen it without your knowledge. So, sometimes incoherent propositions 
are true.  
Incoherent attitude combinations can also, at least on some views, be supported by one’s 
total evidence. Evidence for P is not conclusive evidence for you ought to believe P, making 
possible situations in which both P and you ought not believe P are supported by the evidence. 
Such situations could also arise when your evidence supports P, but is not sufficient for 
justification or knowledge – you have evidence for P, but it’s not clear that you ought to 
believe P. Misleading higher-order evidence provides examples of this – in such cases, both P 
and my evidence is unlikely to support P can be true. This is even clearer in the case of 
credences (rather than full beliefs). A tiny reduction in evidential support for you ought to 
believe P will not necessarily immediately have a corresponding impact on the evidential 
support you have for P itself. Suppose you correctly prove some logic theorems. You are 
justified in having very high credence in their solutions. Then, you receive evidence that there 
is a small chance that your coffee was spiked with a bad-reasoning drug. If it was, then you 
should not be confident in the logic theorems, because the drug causes your proofs to be 
fallacious. So, you should have some credence in the proposition that you ought not believe 
the theorems. However, because these are logical theorems, this is a problem. If you are 
justified in them, you are justified to a maximal degree24. If not, then you are not justified at 
all. Reconciling the evidence you have about the possibility of spiked coffee, and your 
evidence about the theorems is difficult, at least if we want to preserve both level-coherence 
among credences and a traditional view of a priori justification for logic25.  
If level-incoherent combinations can be both true and supported by the evidence, we might 
wonder whether they can also be known. Here is a possible example: 
Kids These Days. Epistemologists in the future have developed a device, the 
Excellent Evidence Evaluator™, which can perfectly evaluate what one’s 
evidence supports at any particular time. Everyone uses these devices and 
comes to depend on them. Your great-granddaughter has one of these 
 
24 At least, that is the standard view. In fact, I have offered some reasons to be suspicious of this in previous 
work (Field, forthcoming, 2019, 2020). I think those reasons also support incoherentism.  
25 See (Christensen, 2010; Schoenfield, 2015; Sliwa & Horowitz, 2015; Brian Weatherson, 2019). 
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devices, and uses it to manage her beliefs. One day when she checks it, her 
device indicates that her evidence supports both P and that the evidence 
does not support P, a level-incoherent combination26. She believes, on this 
basis, both “P” and “my evidence does not support P”. 
Does your great-granddaughter know both P and that her evidence does not support P? If the 
Excellent Evidence Evaluator™ is good enough, then this is plausible. Her beliefs are true, they 
are properly based on evidence that supports them, they are safe (we can assume that if the 
evidence was otherwise, the Excellent Evidence Evaluator™ would not have said it was, and 
your great-granddaughter would not have believed that it was). Note that it does not matter 
here whether we interpret the Excellent Evidence Evaluator™ as also taking into consideration 
the evidence it generates itself, when it makes recommendations. If it does, then your great-
granddaughter gets extra evidential support for both P and that her evidence does not 
support P. If it does not, then your great-granddaughter simply gets information about what 
other evidence in her situation supports. 
So, in some (unusual) cases, level-incoherent beliefs can give us epistemic goods. They can be 
true, supported by the evidence, and even known. If this is right, then this makes incoherence 
more epistemically valuable than we might have thought.  
3.3 Normative Deliberation 
The third, and perhaps most significant, reason that incoherence is sometimes rationally 
valuable is that permitting incoherence between our normative beliefs about what we ought 
to believe, and the rest of our beliefs, facilitates healthy rational deliberation about what we 
ought to believe. This should be particularly welcome news for epistemologists, but not only 
epistemologists. Juries considering a defendant’s guilt, or scientists considering what to 
conclude must also sometimes consider whether their beliefs are well-supported. Views that 
permit incoherence between normative and everyday beliefs can allow agents to rationally 
respond to evidence about what they ought to believe in the ordinary way, with minimal 
disruption to the rest of one’s beliefs.  
 
26 It does not matter here whether we interpret the Excellent Evidence Evaluator™ as also taking into 
consideration the evidence it generates itself, by making recommendations. If it does, then your grand-daughter 
gets extra evidential support for both <P> and <the evidence does not support P>. If it does not, then your-
grand-daughter simply gets information about what other evidence in her situation supports.  
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Views that require coherence at all times cannot do this – they cannot allow agents to 
response appropriately to evidence about their normative beliefs while leaving the rest of 
their beliefs unaffected. If they receive evidence that they ought not believe P, then they must 
either reduce confidence in P, or dismiss the evidence. If they are in no position to dismiss the 
evidence, this can be highly destructive27. It may be that the higher order evidence was 
misleading, and there was nothing wrong with the belief that P. As Alexander puts it, "for 
philosophers who spend their time puzzling over the nature of epistemic justification, higher-
order doubt is an occupational hazard." (2013: 2-3). 
Some who endorse the Enkratic Principle have thought that the way around this problem is 
to argue that we are, in fact, always in a position to dismiss misleading evidence about what 
rationality requires (Ichikawa & Jarvis, 2013; Littlejohn, 2015; Smithies, 2012, 2015; 
Titelbaum, 2015). This view rules out the very possibility of having evidence that could 
support false views about what rationality requires. As I have argued elsewhere (2019), I think 
this claim about which evidential situations are possible is highly implausible. In ordinary 
cases, it would be highly inappropriate to dismiss evidence in this way, even if it is misleading. 
So, we would need a very good reason to think that misleading evidence about what 
rationality requires is to be treated differently to ordinary cases. The important point here is 
how detrimental this is to inquiry about normative beliefs. If misleading evidence about what 
rationality requires was impossible, no one could ever hold a false view about what rationality 
requires rationally.  
In fact, I think there are plenty of examples of healthy deliberation about normative matters 
of epistemology in which we should evaluate an incoherent agent more positively than a 
coherent agent.  
Consider two students studying epistemology. Both are studying some false epistemic view 
about what rationality requires. The view, says rationality requires that you always ɸ. I like to 
imagine that ɸ stands for “comply with the Enkratic Principle”, but readers are free to imagine 
something else – perhaps “conciliate in response to disagreement”, or “believe only what you 
know”. The students are taking a class in which they receive various kinds of evidence for this 
false view. For example, they receive testimony from someone who seems like an expert, and 
 
27 As I have argued elsewhere, I do not think this is plausible (Field (2019)).  
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they study all the best arguments for the view. Importantly, these are students – at this stage 
in their philosophical education they lack the ability to see through the arguments, and we 
should not expect them to exert excessive effort trying.  
The first student, Andy, does not pay much attention in class or do the homework exercises. 
He exerts minimal intellectual effort, largely ignoring the arguments and testimony he 
receives in class, and would have nothing to say in response to them. He considers what 
rationality requires of him with respect to ɸ-ing, finds the idea of ɸ-ing “silly”, and so refuses 
to believe that he is required to ɸ28. Although his beliefs are true and comply with the Enkratic 
Principle, this is not an example of rational deliberation about what rationality requires.  Andy 
reasons “upstream”29, disregarding his evidence, and he does so for insufficent reason (he 
just thinks the view is “silly”).  
The second student, Anna, violates the Enkratic Principle but intuitively deliberates more 
rationally. Anna considers what her teacher says and the arguments studied in class. She sees 
how the arguments lead to the conclusion that rationality requires ɸ-ing, and she sees no way 
to refute them, so she believes this. However, when she tries to actually ɸ, she finds this 
difficult – it seems so very counterintuitive. So, she has level-incoherent beliefs. However, she 
has managed her beliefs well. She believed the conclusion of a convincing argument, and she 
refrained from believing what seems counterintuitive. She is incoherent, but this incoherence 
stems from good epistemic dispositions. What this shows is that while we might have thought 
that complying with the Enkratic Principle was an example of good epistemic disposition, in 
virtue of promoting epistemic goods such as truth and knowledge, this is not always true. 
Sometimes, incoherent belief is a better route to these epistemic goods30. In absence of 
independent reason to think that the Enkratic Principle is a requirement of rationality, we 
should not assume that violations of the Enkratic Principle are always irrational31.    
In the moral domain, the idea that our beliefs about morality can diverge from the facts about 
 
28 Compare cases of reliable clairvoyants (see Bonjour (1985)) – Andy gets it right, but does not have good reason 
to believe that he is getting it right. In fact, he may be doing even worse than the clairvoyents – he has bad 
reasons to think he is getting it right. 
29 As Kolodny (2005: 529) puts it. See also Schroeder’s ‘symmetry’ objection to thinking of the practical Enkratic 
Principle as wide scope (Schroeder (2004: 339)), which points out that only some of the ways one could bring 
oneself in line with the Enkratic Principle intuitively seem rational.   
30 As (Lasonen-Aarnio, 2014, 2020; Brian Weatherson, 2019) have also argued. See also (Lasonen-Aarnio, 
forthcoming) on the role of dispositions in epistemic evaluation.  
31 I argue elsewhere that there is no such independent reason (Field, ms). 
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what we ought to do is much less controversial. Various philosophers have thought that moral 
virtue and praiseworthiness comes apart from having true beliefs about what morality 
requires. These philosophers have thought it possible for agents to act akratically – doing 
something right while believing it is wrong – and nevertheless be fully praiseworthy. For 
example, (Arpaly, 2002; Harman, 2011; Brian Weatherson, 2019) endorse this conclusion 
about Huck Finn. In Mark Twain’s novel The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, Huck Finn 
famously does a good thing (freeing a slave) while believing that he is doing something wrong 
(stealing property). Their view is that Huck responds correctly to his reasons at the first order, 
and does the right thing, while being justified in believing that he is doing the wrong thing, 
because of his misleading evidential situation. Some have thought there are possible parallel 
epistemic cases (see Barnett, 2020). If this is right, and if rationality is, as some have thought32, 
a kind of epistemic praiseworthiness, then the possibility of rational level incoherence should 
not be thought so strange in the epistemic domain.  
Some philosophers have attempted to accommodate the possibility of rational incoherence. 
The following section discusses these attempts, focusing on distinguishing the differences 
between Incoherentism and Dilemmism.  
4. Accommodating Conflict 
In this section, I discuss strategies for accommodating conflicts between epistemic 
requirements. Of the four I mention, Dilemmism and Incoherentism are the most successful. 
I identify some important differences between the two views, before going on in §5 to argue 
that there are reasons to prefer Incoherentism – at least as a way to deal with higher-order 
conflicts between requirements.  
4.1 Making Exceptions  
First, some have attempted to accommodate cases in which incoherent attitudes seem 
rational by simply bracketing them. For example, Horowitz argues that level-coherence is 
necessary for rational belief in the majority of cases, but there are some cases in which the 
 
32 See e.g. Lord (2018).  
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higher- and first-order evidence support incompatible propositions, and rationality does not 
require level-coherence in these cases (2014: 735-40)33.  
This view denies that requirements of rationality apply universally. They apply in most, but 
not all, cases and they admit of exceptions. The problem with this is that it relies on there 
being not too many exceptions. But, the conflicts under discussion, those that arise from 
misleading evidence about what rationality requires, may occur fairly often – especially if one 
is a philosopher. Even if they were not common, it would be nice if our epistemic theories 
applied in all cases, including the strange ones.  
Of course, Horowitz takes there to be principled reasons why some cases are exceptions to 
the Enkratic Principle. Horowitz points out that in ordinary cases level-incoherent belief 
seems to licence bad reasoning practices. Someone who believes both P and “my evidence 
does not support P” can seemingly rationally regard their belief as inexplicably luckily true 
and on this basis dismiss good evidence suggesting otherwise. “I thought I was going to judge 
falsely”, Horowitz’s akratic agent says to himself, “but I must have lucked out! I judged that 
P, and P is true” (2014: 726). But, this is not how we should want agents to respond to the 
possibility that their evidence is misleading. Surely, the rational thing to do would be to 
reduce confidence in P. However, Horowitz acknowledges that in less ordinary cases, such as 
cases involving austere unmarked clocks in which evidence is likely to be misleading, a level 
incoherent belief combination could be a rational response to the situation. According to 
Horowitz, such cases have two features: they are cases in which there is uncertainty about 
what your evidence is (rather than what it supports), and they are cases in which the agent 
can tell that her evidence will not be truth guiding. In circumstances like this, it can be good 
reasoning to believe both ‘P’ and ‘my evidence is unlikely to support P’.  
Incoherentists can agree with Horowitz that level incoherence can be good reasoning in these 
cases, but they need not agree that these are the only such cases. Consider the previous cases 
in which the students receive evidence for some false philosophical view about what 
rationality requires. It’s not clear that such cases are helpfully described using the distinction 
between uncertainty about ‘what your evidence is’ or ‘what your evidence supports’. We can 
interpret the students as clear about what their evidence is, and what it supports. Nor can 
 
33 The example she gives is a version of Williamson’s unmarked clock case (see Williamson, 2011). 
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they tell in advance that their evidence is not truth guiding – it seems to be a case in which 
evidence behaves in the ordinary way. The problem is rather than what it supports is a false 
view that they ought not allow to influence the rest of their beliefs. 
4.2 Division 
Others have approached conflicts between requirements by making divisions. Division 
strategies attempt to dissolve the conflict by indexing apparently conflicting requirements to 
separate domains, contexts, or senses of normativity. An early example of this strategy is 
Lewis’ proposal for understanding apparently inconsistent belief sets. He suggests that 
inconsistent propositions can be ‘quarantined’ to separate belief sets, thus limiting their 
potential problematic effects (1982: 435). Various philosophers have attempted to dissolve 
apparent conflicts between epistemic requirements by postulating an objective and 
subjective sense of rationality, and arguing that the ought of epistemic rationality generates 
conflict when it is used in a way that is ambiguous between these34. This approach allows us 
to understand agents who have misleading evidence about what rationality requires as 
‘objectively rationally required’ to do whatever the true requirements of rationality require, 
and ‘subjectively rationally required’ to do whatever their misleading evidence indicates they 
should do. Some have fleshed out this strategy by arguing that ̀ ought’ is context-dependent35. 
Contextualism about ought says that to ask what the agent `ought’ to do is to ask a question 
that does not make sense until we specify the context of the ought. So, there is one context 
in which the agent ought to have the attitudes demanded by the true requirements of 
rationality, and another in which she ought not. Similarly, some have distinguished distinct 
senses of ‘rationality requires’: structural and substantive senses; evidential and coherence-
based senses36; or a `content-orientated’ sense and a `disposition-orientated’ sense37.  
However, there are problems for the dividing strategy. Dividing strategies dissolve the 
conflict, preserving the elements that contributed to it while denying that they genuinely 
 
34 See, for example, Alston (1985); Feldman (1988a); Gibbard (2005); Gibbons (2013); Goldman (1986); Kvanvig 
(1984); Pollock (1979); Schroeder (2009); Unger (1986)). 
35 See Björnsson & Finlay (2010), Pittard & Worsnip (2017), Worsnip (forthcoming). 
36 Worsnip (2018). 
37 This is the distinction made by Williamson (2017). The ‘content-orientated’ sense is that according to which it 
is rational to believe p iff one’s evidence supports p, while the ‘disposition-orientated’ sense is that according to 
which it is rational to believe p iff `in the same circumstances with the same evidence someone disposed to 
conform their beliefs to what their evidence supports would believe p’. This appeal to dispositions owes much 
to Lasonen-Aarnio’s work, for example (Lasonen-Aarnio, 2010, 2014).  
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conflict. One problem with this is that the rationale for dividing can seem ad hoc. For example, 
Worsnip argues that the requirements of evidence and the requirements of coherence 
represent distinct senses of rationality with distinct, non-conflicting sets of normative 
requirements (2018: 39). He compares the distinction between the demands of evidence and 
coherence to the distinction between the demands of morality and prudence. Although they 
both bear on actions, morality and prudence are not demands of the same kind. Likewise, he 
argues, the requirements of evidence and coherence both bear on beliefs, but do not make 
demands of the same kind. However, it is not as clear as it needs it to be that the demands of 
evidence and coherence are distinct in the way that the demands of morality and prudence 
are. Evidence and coherence at least seem to both be demands that govern evaluations of 
epistemic rationality. While it would, perhaps, be convenient to separate them we need a 
good reason to do this. We also need some idea of how to individuate normative domains. 
Without this, it is difficult to decide when conflict is reason to divide, and when not.  
One way to individuate normative domains is by reference to the kind of force that a set of 
requirements has. The requirements of morality have a moral force – one is required to 
comply with them for moral reasons, such that failing to do so would be morally wrong, or 
morally blameworthy. Prudential requirements do not have this force. One should comply 
with the requirements of prudence for prudential reasons, such as that to fail to do so would 
be against one’s best interest. However, the demands of evidence and coherence, if they have 
any force, seem to have epistemic force. For both, it seems that one should comply with them 
for epistemic reasons, such as that failing to do so would be epistemically irrational38. That a 
pair of requirements lead to conflict is not a reason, on its own, to think that they must belong 
to different normative domains.  
 
4.3 Dilemmism and Incoherentism 
Dilemmism makes a more serious attempt to accommodate incoherence within our epistemic 
theories. Dilemmism and Incoherentism agree on various points. For example, they agree that 
sometimes, when it seems that you are subject to conflicting requirements, this reflects a 
 
38 This sidesteps a vast literature on whether we have reason to be rational. There is much more to be said about 
whether and why one should comply with the demands of epistemic rationality, but this is not the focus of the 
discussion (see Broome (1999; 2013); Kolodny (2005)).  
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genuine feature of normative reality that is, in some sense, incoherent. However, there are 
important differences in how they accommodate this feature.  
Dilemmism says that there are epistemic dilemmas – situations where you are “damned if 
you do, damned if you don’t” (Hughes, forthcoming). In such situations, the agent is subject 
to two conflicting requirements. Each requirement is equally real, and neither takes 
precedent over the other. There is no way for the agent to proceed without violating at least 
one of the requirements.  
For example, consider the case in which the reasonable thing to believe is that your bike is in 
the shed. That is where you left it, there is no reason to suspect it has been stolen, you left it 
locked up, etc. However, your bike has been stolen and it is not in the shed. Hughes (2019) 
argues that this is an epistemic dilemma. On the one hand, you ought not believe that your 
bike is in the shed, because that is not true. On the other hand, you ought to believe that your 
bike is in the shed, because that is what it would be reasonable to believe (given your available 
evidence). It is a dilemma because there are two genuine epistemic requirements that are 
equally important and equally binding – the requirement not to believe falsehoods, and the 
requirement to believe what is reasonable. No matter what you do, you will be violating one 
of these requirements. So, no matter what you do, you will be failing to do what is required 
of you.  
Dilemmists can accommodate the conflict involved in cases of misleading evidence about 
what rationality requires by treating them as epistemic dilemmas. Dilemmism might plausibly 
recognise the following requirements:  
EVIDENCE: Believe what your evidence supports. 
ANTI-AKRASIA: Do not have level-incoherent beliefs. 
As we have seen, if your evidence misleadingly supports a false belief about what rationality 
requires, then these requirements conflict. By EVIDENCE, you ought to believe what your 
evidence supports, which in this case is something false about what rationality requires. By 
the true requirements, you ought not do whatever your new false belief about rationality 
recommends. By ANTI-AKRASIA, you ought not have level-incoherent beliefs. These 
requirements are incompatible: you cannot fulfil them all at once. Dilemmists can say that 
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this is an epistemic dilemma (or, to be accurate, a trilemma): whatever you do, you will fail to 
comply with at least one requirement.  
Relatedly, Alexander (2013) argues that higher order doubt produces epistemic dilemmas 
because it means that no attitude is justified. Suppose you doubt whether believing P is 
justified. Alexander argues that this puts you in an epistemic dilemma, because it means that 
whatever attitude you take (believing, disbelieving, or suspending belief), it will be unjustified. 
There is no way for you to take an epistemic attitude towards P and be epistemically justified 
in doing so39. 
Incoherentism is importantly different from Dilemmism. Incoherentism says that there are 
some situations in which the agent is required to have incoherent attitudes. In such cases, the 
agent is not subject to conflicting requirements. Instead, rationality issues a single 
requirement – a requirement to, in this particular situation, be incoherent. Incoherentism 
does not imply that whatever the agent does, she will fail to meet a requirement. On the 
contrary, adopting the incoherent attitude combination is what is required of her.  
Incoherentism also has different motivations to Dilemmism. Dilemmism sees its conflicts 
arising from epistemic norms that are independently plausible and do not conflict in most 
cases. For example:  
TRUTH: Believe P only if P is true 
EVIDENCE: Believe what your evidence supports 
Often, these will not conflict. Believing the evidence often helps with the goal of believing 
only what is true. However, in many cases they do conflict. For example, when evidence 
misleadingly supports something false. In these cases, agents will find themselves in epistemic 
dilemmas.  
Incoherentism, in contrast, is motivated by a need to accommodate these cases. It sees the 
epistemic landscape, at least for us non-ideal beings, as frequently supporting incoherent 
beliefs, and in need of norms equipped to deal with this.  
 
39 See also Christensen (2010), and Feldman (2005). Both hint at the idea that higher order doubt generates 
dilemmas, without fully developing the idea.  
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Finally, and relatedly, the only kind of incoherence that Incoherentism requires is level-
incoherence – incoherence between beliefs about what we ought to believe, and the rest of 
our beliefs. This requirement is motivated in large part by the epistemic ordinariness of our 
normative beliefs, and takes the view that normative beliefs have more-or-less the same 
epistemology as the rest of our beliefs. Incoherentism also allows that other kinds of 
incoherence are sometimes permitted – for example when this will lead to epistemic 
improvement, as in FORUMS. The conflict embraced by Dilemmism, however, is more 
general. It is motivated by the observation that various epistemic norms that are 
independently plausible conflict in specific cases. 
Dilemmism and Incoherentism both constitute serious attempts to accommodate conflicts in 
epistemology. However, Incoherentism is more successful at accommodating the specific 
conflict arising from misleading evidence about what rationality requires. The following 
section outlines in more detail the positive import of Incoherentism, and its key advantage 
over Dilemmism.  
5. Incoherentism 
Philosophers, particularly epistemologists, should like Incoherentism. It allows us to entertain 
bizarre philosophical theories about what we ought to believe without demanding that we 
reorganise the rest of our epistemic lives in light of them.  Hume can be rational in wondering 
whether induction is justified by day and playing billiards the same evening unworried about 
how the billiard balls will behave tonight. Incoherentism says that these beliefs are about 
different subject matters, and need not affect each other. In what follows, I show how 
Incoherentism has the advantage over Dilemmism in accommodating conflicts arising from 
rational deliberation about what rationality requires.  
First, there are various familiar reasons why Dilemmism has been thought theoretically 
undesirable, and worth considering as a ‘last resort’ position only. While none of these 
reasons are decisive against Dilemmism, it is worth noting that Incoherentism avoids the 
majority of these40. For example, when in an epistemic dilemma, the agent has no rational 
option. The Dilemmist’s response to conflicts between requirements can thus seem to simply 
restate them unsatisfyingly. This is not the case for Incoherentism. Incoherentism gives agents 
 
40 See Hughes (forthcoming) for an argument against thinking of Dilemmism in this way.  
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a clear recommendation for how to be rational when requirements appear to conflict – be 
incoherent.  
However, some might think that this too is an undesirable feature. While it is true that 
Incoherentism gives a recommendation while Dilemmism does not, its recommendations are 
difficult to comply with. Some have thought it psychologically impossible to knowingly hold a 
level-incoherent belief combination (Greco 2012), there is certainly a kind of Moorean 
absurdity to believing “P, but I ought not believe P”. However, Incoherentism is not alone in 
issuing recommendations that are difficult to follow. The Knowledge Norm is sometimes just 
as difficult to follow, and it remains popular among epistemologists.  It may even be 
psychologically impossible – we cannot always believe only what we know. Dilemmism and 
Incoherentism both put their agents in difficult situations, but Incoherentism does at least 
give us an answer rather than simply restating the problem. This is an advantage, though it is 
not decisive.  
A more decisive reason to prefer Incoherentism over Dilemmism is that Incoherentism has 
the resources to account for the positive features of incoherence mentioned earlier. 
Sometimes, incoherence is an epistemically good thing. Not only can it signal act that one may 
be in the grip of a false theory, but sometimes level-incoherent beliefs are true. Dilemmism 
cannot capture this optimistic stance on incoherence, because Dilemmists take the view that 
when the agent is in an epistemic dilemma, whatever she does will be wrong. Incoherentists, 
in contrast, think that incoherent beliefs are sometimes required, and appropriate responses 
to the epistemic situation.  
Third, Incoherentism is better equipped to deal with deliberation at the normative level – 
deliberation about what rationality requires, or which are the correct epistemic norms, or 
what our evidence supports. Ordinary epistemological views have trouble accommodating 
this. As discussed, as soon as agents are rationally mistaken about the normative facts, 
ordinary theories that prohibit coherence are forced into extremes (see §3.3, p. 14). 
Incoherentism, instead, generates specific recommendations for these kinds of situations that 
are simply extensions of independently plausible epistemic claims. So, if you think that we are 
required to believe what our evidence supports, then this is also true at the higher order. This 
will sometimes generate situations in which you are required to believe something 
incoherent.   
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Dilemmism deals with these situations by saying that agents are subject to conflicting 
requirements. For example, a Dilemmist response to a situation in which an agent’s evidence 
supports both P and my evidence does not support P might be to say that the agent ought to 
both believe P (because that’s what the evidence supports), and not believe P (because that’s 
what it would be reasonable to believe). The two requirements are equally real, but have their 
sources in different epistemic norms – norms of truth and norms of reasonableness. Both 
norms are good, but they often conflict. So, while Incoherentism’s incoherent 
recommendation is just a natural extension of the requirement to believe what your situation 
supports, and the fact that you ought to obey the true requirements, Dilemmism reveals an 
inconsistency in our overarching theory of epistemic rationality – it reveals it to contain norms 
that conflict. 
Fourth, Incoherentism also deals with a generalized version of the conflict arising from 
misleading evidence about what rationality requires. Recall that the possibility of rational 
mistakes about requirements of rationality generalizes to any requirement of rationality. In 
its general form, the conflict between requirements is a conflict between pressure to obey 
the true requirements, or not obey the true requirements. On this reading, the Dilemmist 
response to the puzzle would say that the agent ought to ɸ (because that’s what the true 
requirements require), and ought not to ɸ (because that’s what they rationally believe the 
true requirements require). The conflict seems to be between the following two norms:  
FIRST-ORDER: Do what the true requirements require 
SECOND-ORDER: Do what you rationally believe the true requirements require.  
If this is an epistemic dilemma, it is one that operates at a higher order of abstraction that 
those Dilemmism usually endorses – which usually occur between ordinary first-order 
epistemic norms such as “Believe only what you know!”, or “Believe only the truth!”. 
However, this higher-order epistemic dilemma is not a conflict between particular epistemic 
norms, but rather a conflict between pressure to obey the norms (whatever they are), and 
pressure to diverge from them. Dilemmism says that you ought to both do what the true 
requirements require and do what you rationally believe the true requirements require. In 
this situation you cannot do both these things. This kind of epistemic dilemma concerns not 
just which epistemic norms to obey, but whether to obey the epistemic norms at all. By FIRST-
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ORDER you ought to, but by SECOND-ORDER you ought not. The problem is that this 
introduces doubt as to whether rationality is worth obeying at all. A theory of rationality 
should not, if it can help it, make us doubt whether or not to follow it41.  
Incoherentism avoids this – when it says you are required to be incoherent, there is no 
ambivalence about this. Instead, Incoherentism says that when you have misleading evidence 
about what rationality requires, you are required to both believe the falsehood about what is 
required, but not actually comply with that falsehood. That Incoherentism recommends this 
just follows from the assumptions we made about rationality. We assumed that agents are 
required to believe what their epistemic situations support, and that there are facts about 
what rationality requires. So, you should always believe what your epistemic situation 
supports, also when it supports something false about what rationality requires. You should 
also always obey the true requirements. These requirements do not bear on the coherence 
between the levels of your beliefs, so you can comply with all the true requirements at the 
first order without being level-coherent. 
This gives us four positive reasons to prefer Incoherentism to Dilemmism as a way of 
embracing conflicts that arise from the possibility of rational mistakes about what rationality 
requires.  
6. Conclusion 
I have argued that our epistemic theories should, sometimes, embrace incoherence. In 
particular, they should embrace incoherence when our situations support rational mistakes 
about requirements of rationality. After offering some reasons to think that coherence 
requirements of rationality are overrated, I distinguished some strategies for embracing the 
conflict, and argued that Incoherentism does a better job of accommodating the relevant kind 
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